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Abstract 
This essay investigates the transformation of the faculty of understanding in Kant’s Transition from 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics drafts found in Opus postumum. I argue 
that in fascicles X and XI Kant implicitly reverses the architectonic order of sensibility and 
understanding. Without an account of this reversal, Kant’s critique of Isaac Newton’s conception of 
phenomena and the so called Selbstsetzungslehre (doctrine of self-positing) in fascicle VII fall 
apart. I argue that what is at stake is a challenge Kant makes to his own presuppositions and a 
challenge to the Kantian philosopher who wishes to stay with a strictly ‘critical’ Kant. 
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Introduction 
The architectonic order of the faculties is a much-discussed topic in Kant scholarship, 
particularly the role of the understanding in Critique of Pure Reason. Much less discussed, 
however, is the architectonic position of the understanding in the Transition from 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics (Übergang von den 
metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft zur Physik), Kant’s last, unfinished 
work found in Opus postumum. In this essay, I seek to address this by suggesting an 
implicit transformation of the understanding in fascicles X, XI and VII.  
The question of the transformation of the understanding is a controversial topic in 
Opus postumum scholarship, since it indicates that Kant undermines the critical edifice at 
the level of faculty – a major claim. Early literature on Opus postumum simply shrugged 
off this topic by appealing to the deterioration of Kant’s mental state; if Kant made 
fundamental changes to the critical edifice we should not take this seriously, since he was 
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not in his right mind. Whilst most modern literature does not agree with this tactic, most 
does agree that Transition presents no major change to the faculty of understanding. It will 
be such an opinion that this essay challenges. Hence, the basic questions underpinning this 
essay are, (1) what justifications are there for the transformation of the understanding in 
Transition; (2) if it is the case, what is the genesis of this transformation; and (3) how can 
we account for it in the wider context of the Transition?  
The structure of this essay is as follows. In section 1, I investigate a paragraph 
mentioning the term ‘Sinnenwelt’ in Critique of Pure Reason, to suggest the conflation of 
the faculties, despite Kant’s attempts to keep them separate. I trace this issue back to the 
Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, exploring the faculties as they are sketched out in §23. By 
opening this connection I seek to show the fundamental plasticity of the understanding in 
Kant’s corpus, hence opening the way for the more explicit transformation in Transition. 
In section 2, I present the main thesis of the essay. I start from a discussion of the 
imponderabilis and the observer in the experimental physics side of Transition. Drawing 
on this I plot out three stages of the transformation of the understanding: first, as a faculty 
of production via the act of insertion (hineinlegen); second, as a faculty anticipating 
sensibility; third, as preceding sensibility. This effectively reverses the primacy of 
sensibility, meaning that the understanding directly inserts content into sensibility, making 
experience possible. This is a radical shift away from the critical edifice. 
In section 3 I show how the reversal opens a new slant on the meaning of 
‘phenomenon’ in Kant’s view. This also plays into and is informed by Kant’s critique of 
Isaac Newton’s Principia in fascicle XI, which I investigate. From a more general 
perspective, this questions whether the observations made by physicists are direct, realist 
cognitions or whether we must account for observation as an act preceded by the 
conceptual genesis of the observer. 
In section 4, I show how this reversal allows Kant to formulate the so called 
Selbstsetzungslehre, which in turn modifies the spontaneity/receptivity divide, indexing 
both as actus. My aim is to show that without an architectonic reversal, fascicle VII would 
simply not make sense. 
 In advancing this essay we gain the possibility of opening Opus postumum to 
further critical study and table a fundamental transformation to the critical edifice more 
generally. 
 
1. A Problem in the Sinnenwelt 
In analytic philosophy of science, questions about ‘theory-ladenness’ abound thick and 
fast. One thinker of this theory, Paul Feyerabend, presents a particularly stark image of the 
sciences in this regard. He asks a fundamental question about ‘whether experience can be 
regarded as a true source and foundation (testing ground) of knowledge’ in a natural 
science context, claiming that ‘a natural science without sensory elements’ must be 
possible (Feyerabend 1985, p.132). It is with this image that I think the discussion of a 
transformation of the understanding can be framed in relation to Kant’s work, especially 
The Understanding in Transition 
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the Transition. For Feyerabend’s question – and the whole analytic problematic around 
how best to account for theory and observation – is a fundamentally epistemological-
ontological one, and it is precisely along these lines that the architectonic of the faculties in 
Transition unfolds. But before visiting Transition we must first uncover the basic 
problematic Kant works from, which I claim can be found in his earlier work. 
In the second edition Introduction of Critique of Pure Reason, Kant says that the 
faculty of understanding forms one of ‘two stems of human cognition,’ the other being 
sensibility, both of which ‘may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root.’ 
(KrV A15/B29). The division of these faculties describes two reciprocal relations to 
representations: sensibility as the receptive faculty of intuition and understanding as the 
spontaneous faculty of thought and concepts. Kant tells us repeatedly that one is not 
possible without the other, that for experience to be possible both must simultaneously 
operate in the subject, and the first Critique is very much based on this simultaneity. 
Yet a peculiar seriality emerges between the faculties in the first Critique, wherein 
sensibility precedes the understanding. One of the places this is most apparent is in the 
famous ‘stepladder’ (Stufenleiter) passage of Transcendental Dialectic (KrV A320/B376-
7).1 In this section, Kant describes sensibility and understanding as forming distinct halves 
of a staggered/stepped (gestuft) relationship whereby sensibility passes raw content to the 
understanding, which it organizes according to the categories. It is, in fact, the absolute 
receptivity of sensibility which first makes experience of the object possible and without it 
no experiential material could be given. The sequential theme is continued in the 
Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection, which is specifically designed to keep sensibility 
and understanding from inadvertently crossing paths by introducing a demand for the 
precedence of sensibility: ‘The understanding, namely, demands first that something be 
given (at least in the concept) in order to be able to determine it in a certain way.’ (KrV 
A267/B322-3). The overarching reason for Kant’s sequential ordering of the faculties here 
is to critique the rationalist metaphysics popular at the time, which consistently involves a 
conflation according to Kant. In this regard, the empiricist sentiment is very much 
emphasized, as the words of John Locke demonstrate: ‘the understanding is not much 
unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little opening left to let in external 
visible resemblances or ideas of things without’ (Locke 1995, §17) and this perhaps acts as 
an historical anchor to the seriality of the faculties more generally. Both the first Critique 
and the quote from Locke put forward the assertion that the understanding depends on 
sensibility for its content, i.e., it does not create content. Broadly, this forms the 
architectonic relationship of the understanding and sensibility in the first Critique. 
Although they are supposed to be reciprocal and simultaneous to ward off the error of 
rationalist metaphysics, sensibility must serially precede the understanding. 
But this seriality is not without problems in Critique of Pure Reason nor is it 
entirely un-mysterious.2 The first problem is how Kant can maintain a genuinely reciprocal 
                                                             
1 Also see (Caygill 2007, pp.18-9). 
2 Deleuze notes that the ‘accord between these two faculties is no less “mysterious”’ just because a seriality 
has been introduced. (Deleuze 2008, p.19). 
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simultaneity of the faculties alongside this seriality; does this not represent a blatant 
indecision in Kant’s thinking? Another is how Kant might distinguish between a 
simultaneity and a conflation of the faculties.  With regards the latter problem, it is useful 
to start with a revealing passage in the Antinomy of Pure Reason, Section Nine: 
 
Since, as we have several times shown, there is not as much transcendental use of 
pure understanding as there is of concepts of reason, because the absolute totality 
of series of conditions in the Sinnenwelt is itself based solely on a transcendental 
use of reason, which demands this unconditional whole from what it presupposes 
is a thing-in-itself. (KrV A515/B543, t.m). 
 
The German noun ‘Sinnenwelt’ is usually translated ‘sensory world’ or ‘world of senses’ in 
English, which is largely uncontested in Kant literature.3 I would, however, like to draw 
attention to the complexity of Kant’s use of the word in this context. As a noun ‘Sinnen’ 
means ‘thought’ or ‘meditation’, and it can also be used as a verb (sinnen) meaning, ‘to 
plot’ or ‘to devise’. Kant does not use the word as a verb so it appears that the literal 
translation of ‘Sinnenwelt’ should be ‘thought world’. Yet, the noun from which 
Sinnenwelt is actually constructed, the pluralized form of ‘Sinn’, pertains to physiological 
sense or sensibility so is translated, ‘world of senses’. I do not want to semantically contest 
the meaning of words, but I would like to suggest that an implicit ambiguity resides in 
Kant’s use of the term ‘Sinnenwelt’. Although Kant uses the term in an apparently easy and 
relatively unproblematic way, it does not clearly mark the sequential line between 
sensibility and understanding. Further, if we cache the term in the original ambition of 
Kant’s architectonic of the understanding and sensibility, as reciprocally simultaneous, the 
paragraph seems to lose its point.  For this reason, I argue that we read Sinnenwelt as an 
indication of a tacit condensation of the two terms. 
 To flesh out this claim, when we consider the wider context of Kant’s discussion in 
the quoted paragraph above, we can see how the two poles of sensibility and understanding 
may easily become ambiguously conflated rather than systematically simultaneous. Kant is 
trying to show that a totality of conditions supporting experience is demanded by reason as 
an unconditional whole. But this totality can only be answered by a regulative idea of 
reason (i.e., it cannot be given in sensibility). Yet Kant tells us that the Sinnenwelt contains 
the totality of conditions and is based on regulative ideas of reason. If we read Sinnenwelt 
unambiguously in the register of sensibility alone – as pure receptivity4 – Kant seems to be 
contradicting himself, which is why he goes on to say, ‘the Sinnenwelt, however, contains 
nothing like that completeness.’ (KrV A516/B544, t.m). We are thus forced to introduce 
into the Sinnenwelt a dimension of the thought world, if only for a moment, and in doing 
so we introduce the possibility of an inadvertent conflation of sensibility and 
understanding, which is not explicitly laid out. 
                                                             
3 E.g., (Martin 1974, p.190). 
4 See (KrV A68/B93). 
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The wider historical significance of such a reading is that it propels the first 
Critique back to the rational metaphysics Kant wants to refute. The first node in this line is 
the conflation of thinking and sensory awareness found in Descartes’ Principles of 
Philosophy, where he says, ‘Hence, thinking is to be identified here not merely with 
understanding, willing and imagining, but also with sensory awareness.’ (Descartes 1999, 
p.162). The second and perhaps more relevant node is found in Leibniz’s conflation of the 
sensible and intelligible. Of particular note is the 1702 letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte of 
Prussia, where Leibniz defines three types of notion: sensible, sensible and intelligible and 
intelligible (Leibniz 1989, p.188). The first of these notions is ‘confused,’ which is 
explored a few pages later where Leibniz says, ‘The senses provide us material for 
reasoning, and we never have thoughts so abstract that something from the senses is not 
intermixed with them’ (Leibniz 1989, p.191). For Leibniz, no thought is without an 
element of sensibility and no sense is without an element of thought, which leads Kant to 
say that he ‘intellectualized the appearances’ (KrV A271/B327). It is this Leibnizian 
conflation Kant seeks to upend by introducing architectonic seriality into the order of the 
faculties. 
It is perhaps first in On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible 
World (Inaugural Dissertation) of 1770 that Kant takes issue with the Leibnizian node by 
attempting to systematically distinguish sensibility from understanding.5 The need for this 
clear distinction was prompted by the work of Johann H. Lambert, a Swiss polymath with 
whom Kant corresponded. Lambert had begun to disentangle the term ‘architectonic’ from 
its rationalist metaphysical context of ontology – as it was used in Baumgarten’s 
Metaphysica, for example – to define it as a methodological tool for making systematic 
divisions and determining the true seriality of concepts.6 The distinction at stake and the 
means for making it in the Inaugural Dissertation – a text Lambert read and praised – can 
be said to pervade the whole framework of the first Critique, 7  although there is a 
complicated movement between the two works. That being so, after reading Inaugural 
Dissertation Lambert pointed out to Kant the difficulty of systematically keeping 
sensibility and understanding separate from one another (Br 10:105), but Kant had already 
tried to account for this problem in a subtle yet innovative way in Inaugural Dissertation, 
which Lambert may have missed. 
In Section 5, §23 of Inaugural Dissertation, Kant raises a curious problem. He talks 
of ‘the infection of sensitive cognition by cognition deriving from the understanding.’ (MSI 
2:411). This gives us a clear indication of Kant’s thinking at this point: rationalist 
metaphysics had allowed for a disease-like understanding to infect sensibility at a 
devastating cost. He goes on to show, under Lockean auspices, how such an infection leads 
to ‘illusions of the understanding,’ best stated in the expression, ‘metaphysical fallacy of 
subreption’ (MSI 2:412) whereby a shaky assumption is made based on misguided 
                                                             
5 See especially Section 2, entitled, ‘On the Distinction Between Sensible Things and Intelligible Things in 
General’, (MSI 2:392-8). 
6 See (Lambert 2009, pp.267-8). 
7 See (MSI 2:395) for comparison. 
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reasoning. ‘Subreption’ is appropriated by Kant from the Leibnizian Christian Wolff, who 
derived the term from a concept in Roman law denoting an act of theft through 
concealment. Wolff uses the term to mark the incorrect conflation of experience and 
knowledge. 8  When Kant uses the term, however, he means something like ‘tacit 
assumption’, as when we assume that something is the case when the actual case is 
concealed from us. Although the first Critique encrypts a general opposition to subreption, 
the issue seems to be transposed into the Transcendental Dialectic, where Kant redresses 
the term as ‘transcendental illusion’. These ‘infections’ now appear to be built-in 
transcendental conditions of the possibility of experience, which arise from the ‘unnoticed 
influence of sensibility on understanding’ (KrV A294/B350). This is the same dynamic as 
in Inaugural Dissertation but the prime influencer has now switched and when subreption 
is mentioned directly it is in relation to an error of judgement rather than solely 
understanding or sensibility (KrV A643/B671). In the Inaugural Dissertation the 
understanding does the influencing or ‘infecting’, whereas in the first Critique it is 
sensibility which intervenes. This marks a deep rejoinder in Kant’s corpus, suggesting that 
a reversal of the roles has occurred between the two works. 
Before moving on, it is important to note that in Kant’s attempt to make the 
understanding and sensibility simultaneously reciprocal in the first Critique, he cannot help 
but fall back into a position of seriality, whereby sensibility precedes the understanding to 
avoid (a) rationalist metaphysics (dogmatism) and (b) a complete conflation (amphiboly). 
From a wider philosophical perspective, at stake is a challenge to the notion that sensibility 
and understanding can be stripped of each other or be independent in the context of the 
first Critique prompting us to follow John McDowell’s thinking, ‘that the understanding is 
already inextricably implicated in the deliverances of sensibility themselves.’ (McDowell 
1996, p.26). The Sinnenwelt opens a key clue (Leitfaden) in this debate in that it marks a 
wavering stamped into Kant’s thinking. Thus, any interpretation of Kant premised on the 
rigid separability or systematic simultaneity of sensibility and understanding is put into 
question. This is Johann August Eberhard’s unique insight. He claims that although Kant 
wants to work from the basis of a complete architectonic division and seriality of the 
faculties, this proves extremely difficult without tacitly falling back into the Leibnizian 
conflation of the sensible and intelligible. 9  It also indicates that to understand these 
faculties in a way that makes sense we must be prepared to contextualize them as faculties 
in transition, something that Kant’s early critics such as Eberhard, did not and perhaps 
could not do. 
 
2. The Wound Before the Blow: Fascicles X and XI 
I now move on to Transition and how the understanding/sensibility relationship develops 
in fascicles X and XI which were written between 1799 and 1800. I argue that included in 
these fascicles is a transformative architectonic line wherein the roles of sensibility and 
                                                             
8 See (Sng 2010, p.79). 
9 See (Allison 1973). 
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understanding are twisted and contorted, culminating in the total primacy of the 
understanding. With the preceding section in mind, this should not come as a surprise to us 
and hence the object of this section is to explore the genesis of this modification within 
Opus postumum as well as provide a defence of its actuality. 
By way of a brief contextual background, we must recount the structure of 
Transition. Kant aligns a priori cognition with metaphysics, which has the job of 
interconnecting disparate elemental, dynamic concepts (e.g., attractive and repulsive force, 
cohesion, density of matter) into a systematic unity Kant calls the Elementary System of 
the Moving Forces of Matter (Elementarsystem). 10  Metaphysics does not possess the 
capacity to form the empirical constituents of the Elementarsystem, instead it organizes 
empirical facts given through the activities of physics, according to conceptual principles. 
In other words, in so far as the Transition is concerned, metaphysics has been purged of all 
empirical content, whilst physics is conceived of in a double sense: physica rationalis and 
physica specialis – or in contemporary terms, theoretical physics and special or 
experimental physics. Kant illustrates this by distinguishing between conceptual, formal 
principles and empirical principles in the Xth fascicle of the Transition: 
 
Physics is the doctrinal system of the moving forces of matter in so far as they are 
objectively contained in a natural system. It contains an absolute whole of 
empirical cognition of outer sensory objects (Sinnengegenstande), and as a science 
is called upon to attain the work of natural research (Naturforschung), whose 
material (empirical) principle is based on observation and experiment. The formal 
principle, however – how and what one researches – shall be based on a priori 
principles alone. (OP 22:319, p.106, t.m).11 
 
The formal principle is called upon to provide the conceptual orientation of investigation – 
the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ – and experimental physics, in turn, conducts empirical, 
investigatory research into nature (Naturforschung) using the tools of experiment and 
observation. These tools of experimental physics form the genesis of a change in the 
understanding/sensibility relationship which starts in Kant’s discussion of the lever-arm or 
scale (Hebelarm). 
 In fascicle VIII, written between October and December 1798, Kant says that the 
concept of ponderability of matter, or matter’s tendency to be a significant, measurable 
quantity, ‘presupposes an instrument for the measurement of this moving force (of weight) 
in the form of a lever-arm (Hebelarm)’ (OP 22:138, p.46). Following this, Kant says we 
are also inclined to account for the ponderability of the lever-arm itself along the same 
lines as the matter it weighs, but that this is impossible. The lever-arm cannot possibly 
measure itself in the act of weighing, just as it is impossible to ‘lift oneself up by one’s 
own bootstraps,’ as the saying goes. Thus, if we conceive of the fact that matter can be 
                                                             
10 See (OP 21:181-6, pp.58-61) for a schematic of the Elementarsystem. 
11 Also see (OP 22:355, p.115). 
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weighed, we must introduce a mysterious ‘something’ to account for the matter 
constitutive of the lever-arm, which is unweighable: 
Thus the ponderability (Ponderabilität) of matter is not a property knowable a 
priori according to the mere concept of the quantity of matter; it is, rather, 
physically conditioned and requires the presupposition of an internally moving 
matter which results in the immobility of the parts in contact with one another [in 
the lever-arm], by itself being mobile inside this matter […] Thus, even 
ponderability (Ponderabilität) (represented subjectively as the experiment of 
weighing) will require the assumption of a matter which is not ponderable 
(wägbar) (imponderabilis); for, otherwise, the condition for ponderability would 
be extended to infinity, and thus lack a foundation.’ (OP 22:138, p.46).12 
 
In this passage, Kant considers the ponderability of matter as an external, physical 
correlate which rests upon an internal, non-physical substrate, the imponderabilis. In other 
words, the lever-arm invokes a substratum of matter which cannot be observed but is 
nonetheless present as a necessary condition of the matter being weighed. Such a view was 
not uncommon in seventeenth and eighteenth-century natural science, where it was 
postulated that an imponderable, invisible fluid allowed heat to travel. The difference in 
Kant’s reading of the term is that he tries to establish its place in the critical edifice and in 
the context of Transition this poses a problem since it cannot be ‘written in’ to a 
conceptual schema, nor is it governed by the categories, nor can it be simply equated to 
sensibility. Hence, whilst the imponderabilis is the condition of possibility of the 
empirically determinable weight of matter, the matter of the lever-arm itself cannot be 
accounted for directly. It thus lies in a transitorial site; it is neither an entirely empirical 
object given in sensibility nor an entirely conceptual object given in the understanding. 
Later, in fascicle X, written between August 1799 and April 1800, the 
imponderabilis leads into a methodological engagement, which is the point at which the 
understanding begins to play a role: ‘Physics is a system, but we cannot cognize 
(erkennen) a system as such unless we ourselves insert (hineinlegen) the manifold of an 
aggregate according to a priori principles.’ (OP 22:299, p.103, t.m and italics added). 
What Kant seems to be saying here is that the observer – in an experimental physics setting 
– actively inserts (hineinlegen) content which is not derived from sensibility – i.e., a priori 
principles. We can thus see the problematic of observation and insertion (hineinlegen), 
gleaned from experimental physics, open onto a philosophical-architectonic issue.13 By 
venturing this route Kant intimately connects the act of insertion with the understanding, 
thus morphing the latter:  
 
The understanding must therefore synthetically insert (hineinlegen) the elements of 
sensible cognition into a system of the moving forces to make an experience; 
                                                             
12 Also see (OP 22:260). 
13 As Hansgeorg Hoppe notes, ‘the concept of insertion (hineinlegen) is the central concept of fascicle X and 
XI, which is at the same time clearly related to the experimental approach of physics.’ (Hoppe 1969, p.117, 
m.t). 
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hence, not from experience, but for experience and the possibility of inserting 
(hineinlegen) it into an empirical whole as a system of physics. (OP 22:316-7, m.t). 
 
This epistemic act creates the possibility of experience by inserting content directly into 
sensible cognition and does not stem from the merely organizational operation of the 
categories, but the active, contentful intervention of the understanding into sensibility. 
To account for the stakes of this reading, we may be tempted to return to the first 
Critique, where, in the second edition Introduction, Kant says, ‘we can cognize of things a 
priori only what we ourselves have put (legen) into them’ (KrV Bxviii). On the face of it, 
this is strikingly similar to the passages from fascicle X, e.g., ‘We can extract nothing other 
from our sense-representations than that which we have inserted (hineingelegt) (with 
consciousness of its presentation) for the empirical representation of ourselves – that is, by 
the understanding (intellectus exhibit phaenomena sensum).’ (OP 22:343, p.112). Erich 
Adickes reads passages like this one in a purely logical key, stating that the insertion is of a 
‘categorial function’ (Kategorialfunktionen) (Adickes 1920, p.633).14 But it is clear on a 
basic terminological level that these two passages differ. The second sentence claims not 
only that we a priori take out of things what we put into them via the categories,15 but that 
we empirically take out of things only what the understanding inserts into sensibility. It is 
in this sense that we can understand Kant’s Latin inscription as marking a departure of how 
the understanding operates: ‘intellectus exhibit phaenomena sensum’; ‘the understanding 
exhibits the phenomena of sense’. The understanding can no longer be a simple 
organizational faculty in need of material given to it but an originary and productive-
creative faculty, which does not simply inflect observation but gives rise to it. 
We may still object, however, that no change occurs since in Critique of Pure 
Reason the understanding is also a productive faculty endowed with spontaneity. This is 
especially the case in the Transcendental Deductions where Kant considers the 
understanding as the spontaneous act of combining appearances to find common rules. At 
the beginning of the B Deduction, Kant says: ‘for it is an act (Actus) of the spontaneity of 
the power of representation, and, since one must call the latter understanding, all 
combination (Verbindung) […] is an act of the understanding (Verstandeshandlung).’ 
(KrV B130, t.m). This is pointed up by Gottfried Martin, who emphasizes the 
understanding as a spontaneous power of unifying material via the categories, concluding, 
quite radically, that the ‘understanding underlies the sensible world.’ (Martin 1974, p.193, 
italics added). 16  This would mean that the evolution of the understanding is already 
implicitly folded into the first Critique and that the Transition does not actually change 
anything per se, but merely unfolds this implicit evolution. 
Yet this perspective would ignore the fundamental differences at stake between the 
first Critique and Transition. In Critique of Pure Reason the understanding is simply not a 
                                                             
14 Also see Smith (1992, pp.614-5) for one of the first agreements in the English literature with Adickes on 
this point. 
15 In passages where Kant uses the term ‘hineinlegen’ e.g., (KrV A125) he refers to the insertion of ‘unity’ or 
form according to the categories. 
16 Also see (Martin 1974, pp.124-5). 
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productive-creative faculty since it always needs material given to it, which even Martin 
admits: ‘Human understanding is […] dependent on sensibility, it does not simply create 
its objects but has to have something given to it’ (Martin 1974, p.163).17 Hence, despite 
Kant’s attempts at shaping the understanding into a spontaneous faculty in the first 
Critique, it essentially remains a solicitor, always trying to organize the files of its 
bothersome, disorganized client, sensibility;18 it relies on sensibility for its content and this 
belies the productive-creative core of spontaneity. 19  Although this argument is by no 
means exhaustive, it highlights why we cannot account for the transformative arch of the 
understanding by simply returning to the first Critique as though this evolution were 
implicitly folded into it. 
Returning to fascicle X, it must be admitted that Kant does primarily attempt to 
stick to the architectonic seriality of the faculties but it soon becomes clear that this is no 
longer a viable possibility. The changed role of the understanding begins to call into 
question the basic critical premise that it only works with concepts: 
 
All our cognition consists of two constituents: intuition and concept, which both lie 
a priori at the ground of cognition; and the understanding is that form of 
connection (Verknüpfung) of both into unity of the manifold in the subject, where, 
through that which was subjectively thought is represented objectively, as given. 
(OP 22:415, p.181, t.m and italics added).20 
 
In this sentence the formulation of the understanding indexes two subtle changes: 
first, the change from an act to a form, second, from engaging in connection to being a 
connection. In the Transcendental Dialectic, ‘connection’ (Verknüpfung) denotes the 
standing together and linking of concepts into a nexus and is technically distinguished 
from ‘interconnection’ (Zusammenhang), 21  which denotes the more integral 
interpenetrating principle of unification or synthesis – as in the interconnection of 
metaphysics and physics. In the sentence from fascicle X above, the understanding is 
aligned with connection (Verknüpfung), but not only between concepts, it is now a form of 
connection between concept and intuition; it connects both into a chain. This is a curious 
shift, for although the understanding is a faculty of making connections (Verknüpfung) and 
interconnections (Zusammenhang) in Critique of Pure Reason, it is never considered as 
itself a mediating form of connection or interconnection. 22  Nor is the understanding 
                                                             
17 This is also in line with the Jäsche Logic, where the distinction is made between the ‘lower faculty’ of 
sensibility and the ‘higher faculty’ of understanding ‘on the ground that sensibility gives the mere material 
for thought, but the understanding rules over this material and brings it under rules of concepts.’ (Log 9:36). 
18 E.g., ‘[The understanding] is always busy poring through the appearances with the aim of finding some 
sort of rule in them.’ (KrV A126). 
19 Also see (Massimi 2018, p.170) on the ‘cookie-cutter’ conception of the faculty of understanding, which I 
remain close to here. 
20 Also see (OP 22:418, p.183). 
21 See (KrV A643/B671). 
22 Although one could certainly argue that imagination occupies this role as a function of understanding, e.g., 
as does (Heidegger 1997, pp.62-64) and (Deleuze 2008, p.15). 
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considered a passage connecting empirical representation with the categories in the 
Deductions of the first Critique, where transcendental schematism – an operation of the 
imagination23 – is vital in making formal connections. According to fascicle X it seems as 
though the understanding directly creates the integral connection between subjective and 
objective representation, or intuition and concept, which marks a widening in its field of 
operation.  
Thus, the understanding transitions away from the conception in the first Critique, 
but there is also an internal transformation within the Transition itself, which we will move 
onto now. 
In fascicle XI Kant ‘tumbles down the rabbit-hole’ so to speak, by appending a 
series of rapid transformations that implicitly challenge the understanding/sensibility 
relationship. I will quote three representative passages, which I interpret as a single 
trajectorial arch. I would like to add one caveat to this schematic, however; this transition 
should be contextualized as a problematic, especially in relation to the second transitionary 
position. This is because in these quotations we still see elements of Kant’s previous 
distinctions bubbling and jostling, such that we might frame these steps as segments from a 
continual tension.24 
 
1. ‘the understanding anticipates (anticipire) the influence on the senses’ (OP 22:509, 
p.150). 
 
2. ‘the understanding cannot begin from perception (empirical cognition with 
consciousness), [if it is] to determine the intuiting subject into a complex of 
representations, as cognition of the object (objects). It [the understanding] contains a priori 
the formal element of a system of perceptions prior to these empirical cognitions’ (OP 
22:439, p.161, t.m) and ‘The faculty of making experience is the understanding’ (OP 
22:497, m.t). 
 
3. ‘The material from which experience is originally woven is not the perception of objects 
[...] – not from the material sense receives – but from what the understanding makes from 
the formal element of the senses/intuition’ (OP 22:447, p.165, t.m) and hence, ‘The object 
(Object) is neither idealistically nor realistically given, it is, on the contrary not given at all, 
but is merely thought (non dari, sed intelligi potest).’ (OP 22:441, p.162, t.m).25  
 
Whilst these phases raise many issues in connection with Kant’s corpus, I shall only home 
in on the issues posed to the understanding as we have explored it so far. Because of the 
rapid change between these phases, it will be helpful to briefly unpack them. 
1. The understanding anticipates the material given to/by sensibility. In this 
formulation, the understanding anticipates or expects empirical content before it has been 
                                                             
23 See (KrV A179/B140). 
24 My thanks go to Stephen Howard for his helpful comments on this. 
25 The Latin quotation reads: ‘It cannot be given, but it can be understood’. 
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given to/by sensibility. In this connection, we are flung back into the world of Inaugural 
Dissertation, where the understanding ‘infects’ sensibility rather than the other way 
around. But by this point Kant is working with a model of the understanding as insertion 
into sensibility for the sake of experience. Hence, its anticipation of sensibility is not only 
an infection but an indication of the possibility of experience, or in other words, the 
understanding anticipates experiential material by actively inserting material into 
sensibility. 
2. The understanding makes and is prior to experience and empirical cognition. 
This leads to the relatively small step which involves premising the possibility of 
experience entirely on the understanding’s creation. In this phase the understanding not 
only anticipates material received and given by sensibility, nor does it merely indicate the 
possibility of experience, it contains the material before the subject receives anything 
sensible. It seems that in this phase the understanding is uncoupled from sensibility and is 
no longer sequentially reliant on it to receive material, rather, the understanding now 
autonomously generates its own material which is the basis for experience. It is with this 
phase that Kant undoes the Stufenleiter series, ‘senses […] understanding […] reason’ 
(KrV A298/B355) and the simultaneous reciprocity wished for in the first Critique so that 
the understanding now ‘makes’ experience and precedes sensibility.26 
3. The understanding thinks the object in place of its ‘givenness’ in sensibility – the 
object is only thought. In a crucial and final step Kant sees the object not as given, but as 
thought or perhaps created. This last phase is dubious but demonstrates a crystallization of 
the new understanding/sensibility relation. Kant now contends that objects are made by the 
understanding to such a degree that they are only thought, rather than given, hence the 
Latin inscription: ‘It cannot be given, but it can be understood’. Sensibility becomes 
entirely subordinate and reliant on the understanding as the seat of possibility, receiving 
only what the understanding has inserted. Hence, the object is thought instead of passively 
given. 
From this transformative arch a major question is put to the possibility of a 
materialist dimension in Kant’s fascicle XI discussions. The materialist contention is 
compellingly argued by Jeffrey Edwards, who proposes that the ether constitutes a 
transcendental material condition for sensible experience (Edwards 2000, pp.163-4). But 
this is problematized by the preceding argument in that it would mean the understanding 
elementally inserts the ether, which could not then be a transcendental material condition, 
but a transcendental conceptual condition. This discussion leads back to a general 
problematic root which inhibits the entirety of the Transition: how material forces affect a 
subject that creates the concept of attractive and repulsive force prior to the empirical-
sensible event itself; 27  and stated more generally: how the understanding determines 
                                                             
26 Bryan Wesley Hall claims ‘we make everything ourselves’ is phrased in a purely organizational key. That 
is, that we simply organize perceptions emanating from the ether. This seems a weak interpretation since it 
insufficiently accounts for the radical thesis of the understanding ‘making’. See (Hall 2017, p.192). 
27 As fascicle X makes clear: ‘For experience does not come of its own accord as influence of the moving 
forces on sense, but must be made.’ (OP 22:320, p.107). Also see (OP 21:477, p.41 and 22:408, p.123). 
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material before it is given in sensibility.28 In fascicle XI Kant seems clear that to answer 
these questions effectively we must change the order of the faculties: we only experience 
what the understanding makes possible to begin with, which in this case are the affections 
of force. So, this cannot be read in an entirely materialist sense, which rests on the 
architectonic primacy allotted to sensibility in the first Critique. 
But there is, nonetheless, something stubborn and irrational in this reversal as when 
F.H. Bradley spoke of a world where ‘Death would come before birth, the blow would 
follow the wound, and all must seem to be irrational.’ (Bradley 1916, p.215). That is, Kant 
essentially seems to be arguing for the precedence of the (non-categorial) conceptual over 
the sensible, which cannot square up to the critical edifice by any measure. It requires an 
immense amount of unpacking to try and switch from the standard critical perspective, 
based on traditional causality, to a more fluid perspective, which leads some commentators 
to profoundly question this thesis.  
Frederick Beiser is explicit about not believing the faculties to change in Opus 
postumum. His argument runs as follows. After detailing the fluidity of the understanding 
and sensibility, he goes on to question whether this constitutes a ‘transformation or 
revision’ of the faculties (Beiser 2008, pp.195-6). He answers in the negative, claiming that 
Kant retains his ‘old dualisms’, or his ‘continuing allegiance to the distinction between 
understanding and sensibility.’ (Beiser 2008, pp.197-8). Understanding must still rely on 
sensibility, otherwise Kant’s whole critical architectonic is jeopardized; he would have to 
account for a modification to the theory of space set out in Transcendental Aesthetic as 
well as revise the schematism and perhaps even the Deductions. Furthermore, there are 
textual elements in Opus postumum which seem to contradict this thesis, showing Kant’s 
allegiance to the Stufenleiter rendering of the faculties. How should we account for these 
moments?  
My retort is that Kant works out of a changed notion of architectonic, an 
architectonic building-site of transition, which allows for conflations that would otherwise 
result in error, but this is still tacit in Kant’s thinking, he has not yet formalized it. Thus, 
Kant does not abolish the critical distinction between the two faculties (he remains faithful 
to their difference) but he tends towards reversing them for the simple reason that later 
fascicles depend on this, such as fascicle VII, written directly after fascicle XI. For, as we 
will see in section 4, without the reversal of the faculties the Selbstsetzungslehre falls apart. 
Further, Kant is playful with the relationship between the faculties, sometimes 
insisting on the precedence of the forms of sensibility (space and time), sometimes on the 
precedence of the understanding (especially the synthetic unity of apperception). But as 
stated above, if we fail to note the changed methodological space within which Kant 
works, we fail to note the micro-transformations taking place, one of which is that made to 
the understanding. Hence, although sometimes Kant appears to restate the Stufenleiter 
formulation of the faculties, we must place this in the wider context of transformation 
occurring in fascicle XI, and indeed in the whole Transition site. This can explain the lead-
                                                             
28 This is effectively identical to Kant’s critical question of how synthetic a priori cognition is possible.  
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up to fascicle VII, where, one of the concluding thoughts of fascicle XI is taken to its 
extreme: that the ‘material element of sensible representation lies in perception, i.e., in the 
act through which the subject affects itself and becomes an appearance of an object for 
itself.’ (OP 22:502, p.146 t.m). 29 
 
3. A Problematization of Phenomena 
We can also conjecture a wider problematization around Kant’s notion of ‘phenomenon’ 
here. Phenomena in the first Critique were supposed to pertain to objects given through 
sensibility, divorced from any conceptual engendering, but in light of the architectonic 
reversal this no longer seems possible. A further issue is how this problematic is expressed 
in Kant’s discussion of Newton’s Book III of Mathematical Principles of Natural 
Philosophy (Philosophae Naturalis Principia Mathematica), for one of the main themes of 
fascicle XI is a critique of Newton’s magnum opus.30 I claim that Kant’s interrogation of 
the sensibility/understanding relationship questions Newton’s famous ‘deduction from the 
phenomena,’ but ultimately questions the assumptions about phenomena in Critique of 
Pure Reason. 
In On the Ground of the Distinction of all Objects in General into Phenomena and 
Noumena in the first Critique, Kant connects phenomena with the empirical and sensible 
(KrV A248/B305nC) and noumena with abstractions of sensibility by the understanding 
(KrV A255/B311). After showing the impossibility of having one without the other, Kant 
connects the two terms to the conceptions of mundis sensibilis and mundis intelligibilis.31 
The former, mundis sensibilis, pertains to the ‘sum total of appearances,’ which is intuited 
(this is correlated to theoretical astronomy, ‘which expounds the mere observation of the 
starry heavens’), and the latter, mundis intelligibilis, pertains to the interconnection 
(Zusammenhang) of appearances which is thought (this is correlated to ‘contemplative 
astronomy’ such as Newton’s laws of gravitation). The latter makes ‘an intelligible world 
representable’, or, a world of understanding something phenomenally given (KrV A256-
7/B312-3). So here, Kant’s theorization of the place-holder of phenomena is quite bound 
up with Newton’s use but in a very peculiar way. By aligning Newton’s phenomena with 
mundis intelligibilis, Kant effectively places them in the register of noumena, obviously a 
contradictory move, since Newton could not have ‘deduced’ his theory from noumena. So 
what does Newton say about phenomena? 
To begin an exegesis of what this term means in Newton’s system, we must start 
with the basic methodological premise that Newton claims to have no metaphysical edifice 
in his work, since he is not engaging in formal questions of how we know, but with the 
                                                             
29 I am in agreement with Lehmann in foregrounding the aspect of the subject as an appearance here: ‘The 
subject posits itself not merely as cogito, rather as an object in appearance, as psychophysical subject, as an 
organism.’ (Lehmann 1969, p.409, m.t). Also see (Basile 2013, p.135-7) for an overview of Lehmann’s 
understanding of the Selbstsetzungslehre. 
30 See (Caygill 2005, p.33). See (Tuschling 1971, p.91) for a list of references to the ‘Newton-Polemik’ in 
Opus postumum. 
31 Sinnenwelt (world of senses) – see section 1 of this essay – and Verstandeswelt (world of understanding), 
respectively. 
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mathematical foundations of what we know via the content of scientific observation and 
experiment.32 It is in this sense that he ‘present[s] principles of philosophy that are not […] 
philosophical but strictly mathematical’ (Newton 1999, p.439), and that these are ‘deduced 
from the phenomena’ (Newton 1999, p.589) rather than from hypotheses. Hence, trying to 
locate a direct philosophical vocabulary of phenomena in the framework of Principia 
would seem like a futile exercise, but their difference from hypotheses suggests an indirect 
clue as to what this might look like. 
Newton meant many things by the term ‘hypothesis’ which Alexandre Koyré has 
usefully catalogued. Koyré demarks an early use of the term by Newton as ‘a fundamental 
assumption or supposition in a theory.’ (Koyré 1965, p.264). This is the general sense of 
the term in the seventeenth century, whereby one can develop a hypothesis to justify a 
more general theory. It is not in this sense, however, that Newton is against hypotheses 
later in his life but a narrower definition with connotations of fictionalization or 
unscientific presumption for the sake of a theory – of which Descartes and Leibniz are the 
chief targets in Newton’s mind. In this narrower definition, hypotheses present a feigned 
(fingo) framework upon which no science can be based. 33  In Book III of Principia 
hypotheses are contrasted with the rules of philosophical reasoning (regulae 
philosophandi) and the phenomena from which wider mathematical propositions can be 
deduced. We know this contrast is great because, as Koyré points out, the first edition of 
Book III listed nine ‘hypotheses’, whilst the second and third editions replace these with 
the three then four ‘rules’ respectively, and the six ‘phenomena.’34 With this change we are 
given the entry point into a more broadly philosophical perspective than other sections of 
the Principia. What are the rules of philosophical reasoning and the phenomena? Are we to 
assume that phenomena are empirical receptions given in sensibility and rules the 
categorical strictures placed upon this content? That is, can we read a critical epistemology 
into these terms? 
That there is an epistemology in Book III is a difficult claim to stake, but this does 
sometimes seem a suitable description and has been discussed in some of the (non-
philosophical) Newton literature.35 In Rule 3 for example, Newton claims that based on 
evidence gleaned from experiments on particular bodies, we can conjecture about all other 
bodies like them. That is to say, the rule acts much like an epistemological-categorical 
generalization: ‘The extension of bodies is known to us only through our senses […] but 
because extension is found in all sensible bodies, it is ascribed to all bodies universally.’ 
(Newton 1999, p.441, italics added). The ‘all’ in this sentence indicates something akin to 
the critical model of the understanding as a function of conceptualizing inductive 
connections, interconnections and combinations distended from sensible content. So far 
this is a model which seems to conform to the traditional Kantian critical edifice. 
                                                             
32 See (Caygill 2005, p.38). 
33 See (Koyré 1965, pp.34-5). 
34 See (Koyré 1965, pp.262-3) and (Newton 1999, p.440). 
35 For example, (Kerszberg 2012, p.530) discusses ‘two epistemological strategies’ at play in the deduction 
from phenomena. 
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But a problem emerges when trying to map the faculty of sensibility onto Newton’s 
phenomena. To take the first two examples:  
 
Phenomenon 1: The circumjovial planets [satellites of Jupiter], by radii drawn to 
the centre of Jupiter, describe areas proportional to the times, and their periodic 
times – the fixed stars being at rest – are as the 3/2 powers of their distances from 
that centre. (Newton 1999, p.443). 
 
Phenomenon 2: The circumsaturnian planets [satellites of Saturn], by radii drawn 
to the centre of Saturn, describe areas proportional to the times, and their periodic 
times – the fixed stars being at rest – are as the 3/2 powers of their distances from 
that centre. (Newton 1999, p.444). 
 
These phenomena constitute a series of inferences, describing mathematically the 
behaviour of physical, celestial bodies. Within the descriptions of the phenomena Newton 
includes a table which collates all the observational data that goes toward making up a 
single phenomenon, from the observations of Giovanni Alfonso Borelli to the observations 
of Giovanni Domenico Cassini. The importance of observational data for verifying 
phenomena, or even simply describing them, tells us immediately that for Newton 
phenomena are not ‘given’ in empirical sense-impressions but are constructed from 
inherently conceptualized statistics of observation. The phenomena Newton works with are 
strictly numerical documentations of the times and distances of elliptical orbits and hence 
are resistant to alignment with sensibility or the critical conception of the faculties more 
generally. As much as the term ‘phenomenon’ in the modern context has become generally 
intertwined with a relation to sensibility (perhaps no thanks to Critique of Pure Reason), 
this is simply not so in the Principia. There are no sensible correlatives in Book III, only 
mathematical correlatives, which seems an entirely purposeful intention of Newton, who, 
as I have quoted above, claims he only engages in principles of mathematics which form a 
foundation on which to base natural philosophy. 
 Kant picks up on this complicated situation in fascicle XI by raising the issue of the 
title Newton chose for his ‘immortal work’. The problem Kant has is that a mathematical 
principle cannot properly lie at the foundation of a philosophy of nature, just as a 
philosophical principle cannot lie at the foundation of a mathematics of nature; both 
occupy separate territories and would need to be put through the rigorous building-site of 
transition in order to find their intermediary concepts (Mittelbegriffe/Zwischenbegriffe), 
before transitioning from one to the other (OP 22:488-9, p.138). Kant takes this 
problematization to an extreme, suggesting two new branches: 1. ‘Philosophical principles 
of natural science’ (scientiae naturalis principia philosophica) and 2. ‘Mathematical 
principles of natural science’ (scientiae naturalis principia mathematica) (OP 21:238, m.t). 
Between August and September 1798, in fascicle IV, Kant hints at the problematic implicit 
in Newton’s methodology, 
 
The Understanding in Transition 
 39 
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS 
International Journal of Philosophy 
N.o 9, Junio 2019, pp. 23-48 
ISSN: 2386-7655 
Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.3250380 
 
What are called the mathematical foundations of the science of nature 
(philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica), as expressed by Newton in his 
immortal work, are (as the expression itself indicates) no part of the philosophy of 
nature. They are only an instrument (albeit a most necessary one) for the 
calculation of the magnitude of motions and moving forces (which must be given 
by observation of nature) and for the determination of their laws for physics. (OP 
21:482, p.43). 
  
Hence, in Kant’s mind it is absurd to engage in a mathematical foundation of natural 
philosophy, since it acts merely as the instrumental calculation of moving forces 
(phenomena), not their grounding principle. Accordingly, Newton made a fundamental – 
not to mention architectonic – error by engaging in an amphiboly of two different 
territories without explaining the transitorial principle for doing so. In fascicle XI Kant 
claims that vis a vis this confusion, the Principia ‘assumes’ gravity ‘for the sake of the 
system’ (OP 22:455, p.125),36 which means it engenders the definition of a conceptualized 
phenomenon against a sensible phenomenon. Thus, a non-empirical – conceptual – gloss 
must be given to Book III, wherein it does not unfold according to phenomena understood 
in the register of sensibility, but in the register of the understanding. But as I have argued 
above, Newton had already mapped out this criticism by claiming only to engage in 
mathematical principles.37 Hence, it is Kant’s theorization of phenomena which is changed 
from Critique of Pure Reason, not Newton’s. It may well be that the object of critique in 
fascicle XI is Newtonianism but the direct result is a critique of the Critique.  
What differs with both Book III and the first Critique, however, is the changed role 
of architectonic wherein the forces – as phenomena – genetically stem from and are posited 
by the subject. Book III did not come close to suggesting this and it dramatically differs 
from Critique of Pure Reason. In a sense, what Kant does with the concept of phenomena 
is place it on the site of transition, turning it into a mid-way point, not quite a pure 
hypothesis, not quite a pure sensible item but inserted via the understanding, nonetheless: 
 
The first principle of representation of the moving forces of matter is not to regard 
them as things in themselves but as phenomena, according to the relation which 
they have to the subject – as they affect our sense, or as we affect our sense 
ourselves. [It involves] inserting the formal element of sensible representation into 
the subject in order to progress from the Axioms of Intuition, the Anticipations of 
Perception, etc. to experience – that is, for experience as a system, not as derived 
from experience. Consequently, [it amounts to] oneself founding such a system a 
priori – composing it synthetically, not deriving it analytically from the material 
                                                             
36 Friedman traces this problem of assumption to Metaphysical Foundations. See (Friedman 1994, pp.149-
50). 
37 Adickes suggests that Kant missed this due to the peculiar English use of the term ‘philosophia naturalis’ 
(natural philosophy), which is equivalent to ‘Naturwissenschaft’ (natural science) (Adickes 1920, p.159n1). 
But it seems unlikely, since the two terms in German or English were not explicitly separated in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Even in Newton’s hands the terms were still obscure, although some 
argue that he set in motion their separation and the eventual supersedence of natural philosophy by natural 
science in the nineteenth century. See (Maxwell 2017, pp.30-58). 
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element of empirical representation. Hence, it is this principle of form – not the 
material which moves the senses (Sinnenbewegende Stoffe)38 – which provides a 
priori the basis for the possibility of experience (by the rule, forma dat esse rei). 
(OP 22:300, pp.103-4, t.m). 
 
In other words, Kant’s notion of phenomenon in Transition diverges from an immediate 
sensible element which affects the subject externally to reflect the fact of its intermediary 
concept (Mittelbegriff/Zwischenbegriff) status, sandwiched between both sensible and 
conceptual elements without clear boundaries between them. In this sense Kant’s 
phenomena are more like Newton’s in Book III (although still very different) than his own 
in the first Critique.39  Further, this underscores the architectonic transformation of the 
faculties in the Transition project more generally as well as beyond the remit of Kant 
studies. 
From a more contemporary perspective, whilst the experimental physicist may 
argue that they merely observe brute facts,40 the transformation in fascicles X and XI 
suggests this can no longer be maintained since ‘to observe’ necessarily indicts the chain of 
genesis of the subject stemming from the understanding. This throws up an extremely 
modern perspective of physics as W.H. Werkmeister points out: ‘It is a fact […] that in the 
Opus postumum Kant developed ideas that are strikingly similar to principles and 
conceptions of modern physics and quantum mechanics.’ (Werkmeister 1980, p.127). The 
transformation of the understanding ties a Gordian knot between observer and observed, 
between phenomenon and subject – an unwitting anticipation of the wave function collapse 
in the Copenhagen theory of quantum mechanics. It is in this spirit that I claim we should 
read Kant when he quotes the scholastic saying, ‘forma dat esse rei’ (‘form gives being to 
the thing’) throughout fascicle X.41 
Hence, in as much as the experimental physics side of Transition is intimately 
bound up with the observation of phenomena, the meaning of ‘observation of phenomena’ 
takes on a new, richer significance emboldened by the understanding. When a subject 
observes an experiment, the observation cannot be considered passive nor primarily 
received through sensibility but engendered by the understanding and the conceptual. 
Kant’s whole line of argumentation in fascicle X and XI is premised on the implicit 
reversal with the understanding as the root from which all possibility grows, or in 
Burkhard Tuschling’s words, ‘We cannot understand nature, the world and its objects, as 
absolutely independent entities but only as products of the synthesizing activity of our 
understanding’ (Tuschling 1989, p.210). Only we must now extend the understanding 
beyond solely engaging in synthesizing material. In this way Kant comes close to 
Christoph Lichtenberg’s view that, ‘in observing nature, and especially the order found in 
                                                             
38 Literally, ‘sense-moving material’. 
39 I am in agreement with (Friedman 1994, pp.230-1) on this point. 
40 The now classic example is (Kuhn 2012, pp.25-8) where three descriptions are given to account for ‘fact-
gathering’. 
41 See (OP 22:318, p.105; 22:322, p.108; 22:355, p.115). 
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nature, we are always only observing ourselves.’ (Lichtenberg 2012, p.113). Building on 
such a sentiment in fascicle XI, Kant races to an extreme point in fascicle VII and the 
Selbstsetzungslehre, which I now turn to. 
 
4. The Selbstsetzungslehre and Fascicle VII 
Most of fascicle VII discusses ‘self-positing’ (Selbstsetzung). Exactly what this means for 
Kant and how it plays into the evolution of the understanding shall be the focus of this 
section.  
As a preliminary starting point, it is worth noting Kant’s methodological use of the 
term ‘positing’ (Setzung) in his 1763 essay The Only Possible Argument in Support of a 
Demonstration of the Existence of God. Kant tells us that positing involves positioning 
relations, and hence defines the concept of combination (verbindungsbegriff) (BDG 2:73). 
This constitutes a ‘relative’ element or the epistemological side of the act of positing as 
opposed to the ontological, which Kant describes as ‘absolute positing’, an attribute of 
God. More importantly, in the next sub-section Kant goes on to state that ‘a distinction 
must be drawn between what is posited and how it is posited’ (BDG 2:75). Although in 
1763 Kant had not developed clear distinctions of methodology, the difference between 
‘what’ and ‘how’ in the act of positing hints at a distinction between the practical and 
theoretical in Kant’s later corpus. Indeed, these two sides return in the Selbstsetzungslehre, 
written some 37 years after the Only Possible Argument, playing an important role in 
differentiating the theoretical-epistemological (‘how’) discussions from the practical-moral 
(‘what’) discussions of self-positing. In the following, I investigate the theoretical-
epistemological (‘how’) side of fascicle VII. This brief departure is a reminder that Kant is 
not introducing a new concept, he is transforming an old concept, whilst sticking to its 
original methodological underpinning.42 
In a letter to Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk of November 5, 1797, Kant refers to the act 
of positing (setzen) as ‘the a priori condition of apperception’ (Br 12:213), pointing up the 
link between apperception and positing, claiming that ‘positing, as a function of the mind, 
is spontaneity and, like all functions of self-consciousness, is a spontaneous synthesis 
(zusammensetzen) and therefore a function of unity.’ (Br 12:213). This is a good place to 
start, since three years later Kant begins writing on self-positing in a much more sustained, 
radical way. Thus, I will start with the Transcendental Deductions to better understand the 
role of apperception, before moving on to the Selbstsetzungslehre. 
Although there are voracious disagreements over the divergencies of the two 
Transcendental Deductions, we may say that both share the contention that transcendental 
apperception constitutes a synthesis.43 In schematic terms, transcendental apperception is 
                                                             
42 Alongside Eckart Fӧrster, I disagree with Adickes when he says that Kant only engages in a repetition of 
Fichtean ‘extreme idealism’ by adopting the popular discourse of ‘setzen’ (Adickes 1920, p.668). The term 
had already been theorized in Kant’s work long before. See (Fӧrster 1989, pp.217-8). 
43 To pick two examples, the A edition reads, ‘the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of 
oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances 
in accordance with concepts’ (KrV A108); and the B edition reads, ‘it is only because I can combine a 
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the identity or synthetic unity of the subsisting ‘I think’ which accompanies and unifies all 
representations of objects in sensibility into a singular self-conscious experience (KrV 
B131-2). In its role as a unifier, Kant theorizes that apperception precedes the empirical 
content of objects: ‘no cognitions can occur in us, no connection and unity among them 
without that unity of consciousness that precedes all data of the intuitions’ (KrV A107, 
italics added). And in the B edition Kant is even more direct:  
 
The synthetic unity of consciousness is therefore an objective condition of all 
cognition, not merely something I myself need in order to cognize an object 
(Object) but rather something under which every intuition must stand in order to 
become an object (Object) for me. (KrV B138). 
 
Transcendental apperception, then, is the condition of possibility of all cognition, through 
which sensible objects must pass to become ‘objects for me’. But it is only this in so far as 
it unifies the field of disparate empirical material into a singular experience according to 
the categories. That is to say, Kant sticks to the architectonic ordering of the faculties 
peculiar to the first Critique: simultaneous reciprocity and Stufenleiter seriality. 
The importance of the faculty of understanding in this regard cannot be 
downplayed, however. Indeed, Kant notes that ‘the synthetic unity of apperception is the 
highest point to which one must affix all use of the understanding’ (KrV B134). The 
‘highest point’ pertains to the various stages in the A Deduction: (1) synthesis of 
apprehension in intuition – aligned with sensibility; (2) synthesis of reproduction – aligned 
with imagination; and (3) synthesis of recognition in the concept – aligned with the 
understanding (KrV A98-110). Via the categories, the understanding organizes the material 
synthetically and ‘legislates’ 44  over sensibility, which is combined in transcendental 
apperception. This is a contested area of Kant scholarship45 and there are many perspective 
we could take, but we at least get a sketch of a relationship between the faculty of 
understanding and transcendental apperception, that the latter has its root in the former. 
Returning to the motif put forward in section 2, another important factor is Kant’s 
identification of the spontaneity of transcendental apperception with the understanding, 
which he states clearly in the B Deduction: ‘this representation is an act of spontaneity, i.e., 
it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility.’ (KrV B132).46 But what is spontaneous 
about transcendental apperception, if all it can do is unify – and ‘legislate’ over – sensible 
content? To table an answer it seems obvious to return to the understanding as the act of 
combining appearances to find their common rules and form through the categories, as 
Kant does in the A Deduction (KrV A127), but this would water down the much stronger 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
manifold of given representations in one consciousness that it is possible for me to represent the identity of 
the consciousness in these representations itself’ (KrV B133-4). 
44 See (Deleuze 2008, pp.13-5). 
45 See (Gardner 1999, p.145 and pp.158-9) and (Martin 1974, pp.192-3). 
46 Also see (KrV A126). 
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thesis that spontaneity involves production and creation.47 We see this notion emerge at the 
beginning of Transcendental Logic, where Kant uses the term ‘hervorbringen’ to describe 
the spontaneity of understanding, which is translated ‘bringing forth’ but should be 
appended by the terms, ‘to generate’, ‘to spawn’ or ‘to produce’. This productive-creative 
aspect of spontaneity does not seem at stake in the Transcendental Deductions, however, 
especially not in connection with transcendental apperception and the understanding, 
which remain organizational. 
Zooming out to the Selbstsetzungslehre, we initially find a similar line of thought to 
the Deductions. For example, midway through fascicle VII Kant says, ‘The faculty of 
representation proceeds from the consciousness of myself (apperceptio), and this is a 
merely logical act, an act of thought, through which no object is yet given by me’ (OP 
22:79, p.187), which is to say, self-consciousness, or apperception, is a pure ‘ens rationis’ 
or concept without an object, a logical act, or act of the understanding combining disparate 
material. Further, in a deleted passage from the same section of fascicle VII Kant gives us 
further information about the Selbstsetzungslehre’s methodological raison d’être, which 
also resonates with the Deductions: ‘what is thinkable (cogitabile) requires an object 
(dabile), namely, something which corresponds as intuition to a concept’ (OP 22:79, 
p.187). Determining the giveable (dabile) object corresponding to the thinking/thinkable 
(cogitabile) subject is hence the task of the Selbstsetzungslehre.48 It seems that Kant is 
staying within the bounds of the first Critique here, as Edwards suggests, ‘one could, it 
seems, justifiably maintain that the description of theoretical self-positing does nothing 
more than refine the presentation of the a priori anticipation of the form of possible 
experience already offered in the first Critique.’ (Edwards 2000, pp.168-9). 
I claim that although its methodological ambition is similar to the Deductions, the 
Selbstsetzungslehre is fundamentally different because it is premised on the reversal 
effected in fascicles X and XI and hence the understanding is the origin of one’s self as an 
object. This brings to light the productive-creative spontaneity of the understanding and 
with it the altogether new thesis of the Selbstsetzungslehre: to be self-conscious is to posit 
one’s self as an object.49 The emphasis is thus on explicating the specific act whereby the 
subject makes itself into an object for sensibility since this machination cannot be ‘derived 
from a sense-object, but determines the object by its [the subject’s] a priori act, [through 
which] it is the owner and originator of its own representations.’ (OP 22:82-3, p.189, t.m). 
We can see here how the possibility of the subject as object is indexed in the spontaneous 
act of self-generative creation; no longer is the subject with apperception given 
reciprocally with sensibility, nor is it reliant on sensibility, but via the understanding it 
creates the very possibility of sensibility: ‘The understanding begins with the 
consciousness of itself (apperceptio) and performs thereby a logical act. To this the 
                                                             
47 What (Ellis 2017, p.139) calls ‘absolute spontaneity’. 
48 In Fӧrster’s words, it tries ‘to show how the I as mere object of thought (cogitabile) can become an 
empirical object given in space and time (dabile).’ (Fӧrster 2000, p.103). 
49 ‘Consciousness of itself (apperceptio) is an act through which the subject makes itself in general into an 
object.’ (OP 22:413, p.180). ‘Consciousness of myself (apperception) is the act of the subject to make itself 
into an object (object).’ (OP 22:89, m.t). Also see (OP 22:98, p.196). 
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manifold of outer and inner intuition attaches itself serially, and the subject makes itself 
into an object in a limitless sequence.’ (OP 22:82, p.189). What’s more, by reading the 
architectonic reversal of understanding and sensibility into Transition before the advent of 
fascicle VII, we can understand Kant much more clearly when he writes things such as, 
‘That there is something else outside me is my own product. I make myself.’ (OP 22:82, 
p.189). If we were to read these sentences from a strictly ‘critical’ perspective, they 
obviously indicate a major contradiction along Berkeleyan subjective idealist lines. But if 
we read them as logical consequences of the architectonic reversal, that is, in the 
transitionary context from which they arise, we get a much clearer perspective on what 
Kant might mean. Kant is saying that the possibility of the subject’s empirical content is 
premised on the understanding producing – or, indeed, conceptually inserting – this 
content in the first place, and that this content – the object – is therefore made by the 
spontaneous, apperceptive act of the subject. But what then happens to receptivity? 
In the Transcendental Deductions receptivity is defined in opposition to spontaneity 
as an act, but this is changed in fascicle VII, where receptivity must also be considered an 
activity.50 If the understanding precedes sensibility and makes experience possible through 
a self-positing act, then receptivity, the defining feature of receiving sensible impressions, 
must also be made into an act. But how does this active conception of receptivity not 
abolish what Hall calls, ‘genuine receptivity’ (Hall 2017, p.188), and is the relation 
between spontaneity and receptivity not completely undermined here? As Kant himself 
states in the November 5, 1797 letter, the question is, if the subject posits itself as object, 
‘from where does the manifold of sensation come, what in it is the merely empirical aspect 
of sensation? [...] what are these objects that affect sensibility?’ (Br 12:215-6, t.m). 
Unless by ‘genuine’ we mean ‘passive’ I do not think this thesis abolishes genuine 
receptivity. Receptivity is still a feature of sensibility in fascicle VII, but it is not premised 
on a conception of affectivity which lies permanently open like a black hole, rather, it 
forms an active affectivity of openings and closings; a kind of leaping out to take hold of 
content. But then we are led into the second question, does this not reduce receptivity and 
spontaneity to the same definition? This question marks the radical departure Kant makes 
from the first Critique to Transition, for in the latter he does not want to define spontaneity 
and receptivity solely on whether they are acts but also by their relation to forces. Hence 
the distinction between spontaneity and receptivity is not undermined, nor do they become 
conflated and subsumed under the same definition, rather, they are deferred to a different 
set of definitions involving two interconnected ways of being affected by forces. This is in 
keeping with the new dynamical theory of matter Kant develops in Opus postumum. So, 
although there is a change in so far as receptivity becomes an act, it retains its 
characteristic distinguishing feature as bound up with sensibility, only deferred to the 
                                                             
50 ‘The representation of apperception which makes itself into an object of intuition contains a twofold act: 
first, that of positing itself (the act of spontaneity); and [second], that of being affected by objects and 
interconnecting (zusammen) the manifold in representation to a priori unity (the act of receptivity).’ (OP 
22:31, p.173, t.m, italics added). Also see (OP 22:28) and (OP 22:466, p.132). 
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context of force. But this opens even more issues, now to do with Kant’s ‘critical’ 
conception of space. 
According to Tuschling’s ‘subjects at stake’ (Tuschling 1993, p.160), space – 
which was an a priori form of sensibility in the first Critique’s Transcendental Aesthetic – 
undergoes a revision in Opus postumum precisely along the lines of the change made to the 
role of apperception in Selbstsetzungslehre. Keeping with the general ‘productive’ 
thematic of fascicle VII, Kant says space becomes a form ‘which we ourselves make 
(machen)’ (OP 22:76, p.185), that is, if the first empirical content is made via the 
apperceptive subject, then it must also make space, since it is in space that the subject must 
encounter itself as a body. Space is hence no longer an empty, pure form of sensibility, but 
a continuum of posited affective forces – a plenum – pressing upon the body of the subject, 
which ties fascicle VII into the Elementarsystem that Kant had been working on for many 
years before. Although this indicates significant departures from fascicle VII, it is 
important for tracing out the wider consequences the transformation instigates. 
One way to make sense of the modification made to space is given by Fӧrster. First, 
he claims, ‘Space must […] be represented, not merely as a form of intuition, but as 
something existing outside me, as something empirically given. It can be this only if it is 
filled with moving forces’. Second, ‘for there to be experience of any particular object in 
space, the object’s moving forces must affect the subject’. And last, ‘The moving forces of 
matter cannot be given to the subject by being passively received. They are recognized 
only by the subject’s reaction, as forces with which we interfere’ (Fӧrster 1989, p.230).51 
Rather problematically, this suggests an empirical realism with regards to space, something 
which Kant argues against throughout Opus postumum, but it nonetheless shows how the 
possibility of being affected by forces through space is premised on the activity of the 
subject. For the subject to be experientially affected by forces it must intervene by itself 
emanating forces. In this connection, the self-positing subject transforms space into an ‘act 
[…] of the power of representation positing (setzen) itself’ (OP 22:88, p.193, t.m). Hence 
when Kant says, ‘The position (position) of something outside me, itself first commences 
from me, in the forms of space and time, in which I myself posit (setze) the objects of outer 
and inner sense’ (OP 22:97, p.195)52 it comes preloaded with such a modification. Space 
becomes filled with activity, first with the spontaneous act of understanding and then the 
receptive act of sensibility. A shift from space as a pure form of sensibility to space which 
is premised on proliferating affective forces and the dual active capacities of the self-
conscious subject is thus at stake. Accordingly, to be affected is cached in the capacity to 
affect, but the wider implication is that the whole structure is grounded in the original act 
of the understanding, which can only be the case if it precedes sensibility;53 space is the 
subject’s power of spontaneous, theoretical self-positing given in representation. 
                                                             
51 Fӧrster references a passage from fascicle IV in support of this reading: ‘The concept of primordial motive 
forces is not taken from experience, rather it must lie a priori in the activity of the mind, and of which we are 
conscious in moving.’ (OP 21:490, m.t). 
52 Also see (OP 21:38) 
53 In a passage from fascicle X, but written around April 1800 (during Kant’s writing of fascicle VII) Kant is 
clear on this: ‘Our sensible intuition is, initially, not perception (empirical representation with 
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Conclusion 
Ultimately, what the transition through fascicles X, XI and VII shows is an inherent 
experimental playfulness in Kant’s methodological approach. He is willing to put his 
previous distinctions through radical twists and turns, which often result in some peculiar 
concepts and ideas in Transition, such as the Selbstsetzungslehre. But we must always 
situate transformations like this primarily on the architectonic site of transition, for it is 
here that Kant is able to play with concepts in an experimental way in an attempt to find 
their interconnections and points of contact. We should take this approach as a prompt, 
both to engage with Kant in this process of thinking by setting his work within a larger set 
of transitions, but also to challenge our own assumptions about what Kant’s system of 
philosophy actually is. 
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